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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KRISTE A. PITKIN, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
PRESTON'S INCORPORATED and 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants and 
Respondents, 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
The issues in the case at bar are necessarily those 
of law and fact. The question being whether the injury suffered 
by Appellant falls within the perimeters of the Workman's Compensa 
tion Statute, Utah Code Annotated 35-1-44, as being an accidental 
injury suffered in the course of employment. 
Respondent correctly states the Supreme Court's duty 
to determine the correctness of the Industrial Commissions's 
application of the law to the instant fact pattern. However, 
Respondent argues factual issues in his brief and diminishes 
the true purnose of this inquest - to review the law as applied 
to the facts. 
First, Respondent treats the issue of whether the 
Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously by citing 
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pages of transcript in an attempt to demonstrate the alleged 
lack of credibility of Appellant. He thus fails to focus on 
the real issues: 
1. Whether the Commission ever considered other 
competent, substantialf and uncontroverted testimony, and 
2. Whether the Commission correctly weighed 
the contradictory testimony of Patrick Preston against the corrabor 
ated testimony of Appellant. It follows from a careful reading 
of the record that there is no justification for finding that 
the Commission correctly weighed the evidence. 
Contrary to Defendant's argument, Appellant informed 
at least two employees (Heather Hardy and Earl Halverson) and 
the owner of Preston's Inc. (Patrick Preston) of her injury. 
Heather Hardy's testimony places the accidental injury during 
the last week of August (T.R. 93,70). Yet, her testimony was 
never mentioned in Defendant's findings of fact. Heather also 
verified the fact that Earl Halverson had been informed of the 
injury. This testimony was never mentioned either. 
More conspicuous is the absence of any mention of 
Patrick Preston's contradictory and evasive testimony. For 
example, on examination, he contradicted himself in regard to 
Appellant's duties (T.R. 85-86). However, his statements regardin< 
the frequency of his employee's complaining about backaches 
is lucid. 
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MR. PRESTON; Now have you ever had a complaint from he] 
concerning any backaches, or any such similar problem? 
A. Nearly since the day we took over I have 
received complaints about backaches, which I do not 
think unusual. 
MR. PRESTON: Why? 
A. I have never worked anyplace, been involved 
with people, when at some time they haven't complained 
about backaches. Lower back pain (T.R. 82 1. 14-25, 
see also T.R. 83 1 1-19) 
This testimony points to the absurdity of predicating 
a theory of "prior back problems" or ordinary backaches. 
On redirect, Respondent was unsure if Appellant had 
ever complained of backaches prior to her injury stating that 
he, himself, had suffered backaches several times and didn't 
want to say (T.R. 94 1. 20-25). The Commission failed to weigh 
the difference between mundane employee complaints of backaches 
due to weariness and the serious complaint by Appellant of lower 
back and sciatic pain. In fact, there is no substantial, competent 
evidence to show that an industrial accident did not occur. 
Secondly, the notice of claim was given to the Industria 
Commission within the year as required by statute. That a conver-
sation between employer and employee does not fall within the 
statute is totally irrelevant, especially since no forms nor 
Workman Compensation information as well as insurance were even 
furnished by Respondent. Appellent's amended notice was uncontro-
vertibly and properly filed on January 31, 1974 as acknowledged 
on page two of Respondent's brief and precluded such an unfounded 
argument. 
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Finally, to satisfy the Workman's Compensation statute, 
an injury must be accidental and happen in the course of empioymenl 
The accidental nature of Appellant's injury is established under 
authority of Fenton v. Thorley and its progeny. The burden 
of proving an accident in the course of employment is met under 
authority of Baker. Respondent seeks to distinguish Baker by 
alleging that the evidence is not substantialr competent, or 
corraborated. Appellant submits that, as outlined above, the 
testimony of Appellant is characterized as such and is, in additio 
uncontroverted by any substantial evidence on Respondent's part. 
For example, Respondent neither established another cause for 
Appellant's injury, nor established the most remote relivancy 
of Appellant's fall in November, 1974, nor demonstrated that 
Appellant's corraborated testimony was conclusively unreliable. 
The only question squarely presented by the case is 
whether Appellant's injury occurred in the course of employment. 
The law does not require that a victim of internal failure be 
charged with precise knowledge of his condition; indefinite 
statements concerning the cause of an injury are not held to 
defeat recovery. Baker, at 614. From the above statement of 
law and the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact that 
it was Appellant's lifting which significantly contributed to 
the injury, it is clear that her injury was an industrial acciden-
under the statute. 
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There being substantial evidence to support a finding 
for Appellant, the Commission acted arbitrarily in assigning 
more weight to the insubstantial evidence presented by Respondent 
That evidence demonstrates only that Respondent was not in compli 
with the law which requires employers to carry insurance or 
to be self-insurers. Utah Code Annotated 35-1-44. 
For the reasons stated above, the Order of the Industrie 
Commission should be reversed and compensation awarded to Appellai 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Gordon J. Low 
Attorney for Appellant 
175 East First North 
Logan, UT 84321 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postpaid, copies of 
the foregoing brief of Appellant to the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, to George W. Preston, Attorney for Defendant, this 
day of August, 1976. 
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